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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
TERRY RAY DALTON, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 45379 
 
          Ada County Case No.  
          CR-01-2017-17946 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Dalton failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by 
imposing a unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, upon his guilty 
plea to battery against a health care worker, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of 
sentence? 
 
 
Dalton Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 Dalton pled guilty to battery against a health care worker and the district court imposed a 
unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed.  (R., pp.40-43.)  Dalton filed a 
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.44-46.)  He also filed a timely 
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Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.49-53, 54-
56.)    
Dalton asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive 
sentence in light of his substance abuse issues, desire for community-based treatment, acceptance 
of responsibility, and Dalton’s claim that the district court’s sentencing decision “may have been 
influenced by [then] current events.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-7.)  Dalton has failed to establish 
an abuse of discretion.   
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of 
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).  It is presumed 
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  State 
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007).  Where a sentence is within statutory 
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted).  To carry this burden the appellant 
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and 
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  Id.  The 
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when 
deciding upon the sentence.  Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of 
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “In 
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where 
reasonable minds might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 
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146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).  Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court.”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).    
The maximum prison sentence for battery against a health care worker is three years.  I.C. 
§ 18-915C.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half 
years fixed, which falls within the statutory guidelines.  (R., pp.40-43.)  Dalton’s sentence is also 
appropriate in light of his extensive criminal history and his failure to rehabilitate while in the 
community.   
Dalton’s criminal history demonstrates his disregard for the law, the terms of community 
supervision, and the well-being of others.  Dalton’s criminal record dates back to the 1980’s and 
includes three prior felony convictions, over 25 misdemeanor convictions, and dozens of 
additional charges.  (PSI, pp.6-17.)  Most of Dalton’s convictions are for alcohol related or 
violent offenses.  (PSI, pp.6-17.)  He has been afforded multiple opportunities on probation, has 
served jail time, and has been sentenced to prison for his crimes, but he has failed to rehabilitate 
or be deterred by prior legal sanctions.  (PSI, pp.6-17.) 
Dalton’s assertions that the district court’s sentencing decision may have been influenced 
by the events that occurred at a white supremacist rally at the University of Virginia the weekend 
before Dalton was sentenced are unfounded.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)  Although the 
district court noted it was “ironic” that Dalton – who outwardly expressed hatred toward the 
health care worker he battered based on the health care worker’s race (see PSI, p.4) – was being 
sentenced in close proximity to the racially-motivated events that had occurred “in the south” 
(Tr., p.38, Ls.1-12), the court explicitly stated it was sentencing Dalton, not “for what is in his 
heart,” but “for his actions” (Tr., p.38, Ls.12-17).  As found by the district court those “actions 
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[were] to get drunk again, and then lash out at the very people trying to help him.”  (Tr., p.38, 
Ls.16-17.)  Also as found by the district court those actions are entirely, and unfortunately, 
consistent with Dalton’s prior history:  “The charge and charges that he has faced for these kinds 
of actions goes on and on and on and on and on and on multiple felony convictions and a – it’s 
just frankly too many to calculate the number of misdemeanors that he’s either been charged 
with or convicted of for this kind of drunk and disorderly and violent conduct.”  (Tr., p.38, L.21 
– p.39, L.2.)  Dalton’s purported remorse, acceptance of responsibility and desire for treatment 
do not outweigh the seriousness of the offense or Dalton’s continued violent criminal offending.   
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its 
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Dalton’s sentence.  (Tr., p.37, L.12 – p.40, 
L.17.)  The district court concluded, 
Our healthcare workers in the ERs work hard hours trying to help people, 
trying to save lives, and I think as was recognized by the victim in this case that 
sometimes this is the price of their work, which is to be subject to being belittled, 
to hatred and to violence, but it shouldn’t be.  And that’s why the legislature has 
deemed fit to make this crime a felony. 
 
(Tr., p.39, Ls.17-24.)  The state submits that Dalton has failed to establish that his sentence is 
excessive for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing 
transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  (Appendix A.)  
Dalton next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion for a reduction of sentence because he apologized to the victim and wants to get into a 
treatment program sooner.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.)  If a sentence is within applicable 
statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this 
court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 
201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).  To prevail on appeal, Dalton must “show that the sentence 
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is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court 
in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Dalton has failed to satisfy his burden.   
Dalton’s complaint that he wants to start his treatment program sooner and his reiteration 
that he apologized to the victim is not new information that entitles him to a reduction of 
sentence.  The district court was aware, at the time of sentencing, of Dalton’s desire to 
participate in the River of Life treatment program.  (R., pp.54-56.)  The district court stated, 
“While the Court applauds the Defendant’s acceptance in the program and his willingness to 
address his chronic alcohol problem, this is not new or additional information which would 
render his sentence excessive under ICR 35.”  (R., p.55.)  Dalton has not shown that he was 
entitled to a reduction of sentence simply because he apologized to the victim and wanted to start 
treatment sooner.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, Dalton has failed to establish that the 
district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Dalton’s conviction and sentence and 
the district court’s order denying Dalton’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
       
 DATED this 31st day of January, 2018. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ALICIA HYMAS 
      Paralegal 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of January, 2018, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to: 
 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
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Vodka, I go on a binge, I don't know, I black out, I It Is, I suppose, Ironic, nonetheless 
2 don't even remember until I wake up in jail , And I'm 2 worth noting the defendant Is here to be sentenced today 
tired of it. I truly am t ired of it, your Honor. I'm 3 for his actions that expressed a degree of hate and 
4 ashamed of it. 4 malignancy of thought directed towards a person simply 
5 I don't know what to say Mr. Hippler, I s because of the color of their skin, and I recognize 
6 truly need help and I wish you would give me this 6 Mr. Dalton says that he doesn't remember doing this and 
7 chance. I have -- this Is a great chance. The man 7 he does not think I way. 
8 wrote me and gave me a chance. I really want to take s I say it's ironic, because of course what 
9 it. I can do this. 9 happened, unfortunately, this weekend where hate and 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 10 bigotry and that kind of thought resulted in terrorist 
11 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. 11 action killing at least one person and injuring many 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Dalton, on your plea of guilty I 12 others in the south. But Mr. Dalton is not here for 
13 find you guilty. In an exercise of my discretion in 13 what is in his heart and only he knows what is in his 
14 sentencing, I've considered the Toohill factors, 14 heart. I'm not here to sentence him for what is in his 
15 including the nature of the offense and the character of 15 heart, I'm here to sentence him for his actions. 
16 the offender, as well as the information in mitigation 16 His actions are to get drunk again, and 
17 and in aggravation. In determining an appropriate 17 then lash out at the very people trying to help him. 
18 sentence, I'm mindful of the objectives of protecting 18 And I say "again" because he, as Indicated here, has a 
19 society, achieving deterrence, the potential for 19 long history of drinking and then disorderly conduct 
zo rehabilitation and the need for retribution or 20 after drinking. He is a terrible drunk, he is a mean 
21 punishment. 21 drunk, and he Is a v iolent drunk. The charge and 
n I have reviewed and considered carefully 22 charges that he has faced for these kinds of actions 
23 the PSI materials, I've considered the arguments and 23 goes on and on and on and on and on and on multiple 
24 recommendations of counsel, and the statement the 24 felony convictions and a -- it's just frankly too many 
25 defendant made today. 25 to calculate the number of misdemeanors that he's either 
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been charged with or convicted of for this kind of drunk 
2 and disorderly and violent conduct. 
3 And the defendant stands before the court 3 
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regardless of what happens today, I hope that he seeks 
help. But I'm going to sentence the defendant to the 
custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections under 
4 today and asks for one more chance. I can't help but 4 
S think he's asked for one more chance each t ime s 
6 previously. That's not to say that in his heart he 6 
7 truly doesn't want one more chance and doesn't have 7 
8 faith in himself that given one more chance that he 8 
9 might be able to this time maintain sobriety. Maybe he 9 
10 would be able to, I don't know, but what I do know by 10 
11 his history is that it's not a very high likelihood. 11 
12 THE DEFENDANT: I never had a chance, never had 12 
13 a alcohol t reatment program, your Honor, I haven't. 13 
14 THE COURT: The defendant's behavior and conduct 14 
15 certainly should have caused him to seek treatment and 15 
16 help, there's no doubt about that. These many times and 16 
17 these many places throughout the country. Our healthcare 11 
18 workers in the ERs work hard hours trying to help people, 18 
19 trying to save lives, and I think as was recognized by 19 
20 the victim in this case that sometimes this is the price 20 
21 of their work, which is to be subject to being belittled, 21 
22 to hat red and to violence, but it shouldn't be. And 22 
23 that's why the legislature has deemed fit to make this 23 
24 crime a felony. 24 
25 I know the defendant wants help and 25 
the Unified Sentencing Laws of the State of Idaho for a 
term of three years. The court specifies a minimum 
period of confinement of one-and-a-half-years, fiKed 
followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of 
one-and-a-half years. 
Frankly, I considered doing a three-years 
fixed in this case because your history is that bad, but 
I want you to have some incentive to get that treatment 
that you're ta lking about. The program you asked to be 
part of is a good program and I suspect they will be 
there for you when you get out, but you need to 
understand that that kind of conduct simply will not be 
tolerated any longer and there is a price to be paid for 
it. 
So I'm going to impose that sentence, and 
I'm going to remand you to the custody of the sheriff of 
the county to be delivered to the proper agent of the 
state board of correction in eKecution of the sentence. 
Any bail is exonerated. I'm going to order that you 
provide a DNA sample and right thumbprint impression. 
I'm going to order that you comply with the DNA Database 
Act in that regard. I' ll order that you pay court cost, 
